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WATERED DOWN CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS:
A HOSPITAL'S ROLE IN PROSECUTING
PREGNANT WOMEN FOR DRUG USE IN
FERGUSON V CITY OF CHARLESTON
PETRA SAMI
In the wake of the dramatic rise in the use of illicit drugs in
modern society,' the resulting "war on drugs,"2 and more specifi-
cally, the prevalence of drug use among pregnant women 3 and
the media attention on the rise of crack use and poignant stories
of "crack babies,"4 states began prosecuting drug-using pregnant
1 See Bryan A. Gamer, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE, Oxford University Press,
Inc. (1990) (stating terms "illicit," "illegal," and "unlawful" are basically synonymous, but that "'illicit'
carries moral overtones in addition to the basic sense 'not in accordance with or sanctioned by law"');
Mathea Falco, Toward a More Effective Drug Policy, 1994 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 9,9 (estimating 74 mil-
lion Americans have used illegal drugs); see also Schedules of Controlled Substances, 21 U.S.C. § 812
(1994) (providing that "illicit drugs" include all statutorily defined controlled substances).
2 See Katherine Beckett, Fetal Rights and "Crack Moms ": Pregnant Women in the War on
Drugs, 22 CONTEMP. DRUG PROBS. 587, 590 (1995) (noting "[t]he recent campaign against pregnant
women who use drugs, then, reflects the coincidence of the punitive orientation of the 'war on drugs'
and the fetal rights discourse").
' See Derk B.K. VanRaalte IV, Punitive Policies: Constitutional Hazards of Non-
Consensual Testing of Women for Prenatal Drug Use, 5 HEALTH MATRIX 443,443-44 (1995) (stating
that according to 1990 survey of 36 hospitals, 11% of women used illegal drugs during their pregnan-
cies); Report of the American Medical Association Board of Trustees, Legal Interventions During
Pregnancy, 264 JAMA 2663, 2666 (Nov. 28, 1990) (estimating that of the 11% of women who use ille-
gal drugs, seventy-five percent have used cocaine); see also Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288, 1295
(Fla. 1992) (stating 375,000 babies are born each year to women who use illicit drugs).
4 See CRAIG REINARMAN & HARRY G. LEVINE, The Crack Attack: Politics and Media in the
Crack Scare, in Crack in America 18, 23 (Craig Reinarman & Harry G. Levine eds., 1997) (describing
media's role in resulting public view of crack use as violation of moral norms, and depicting the me-
dia's portrayal of crack and other illegal drug as "virulent diseases that were attacking American soci-
ety"). For media depiction in 1980's and 1990's of dramatic stories of the "crack baby," see Anastasia
Toufexis, Innocent Victims, TIME, May 13, 1991, at 56 (describing emotional and mental difficulties of
children born to crack addicted mothers); see also Barbara Kantrowitz, The Crack Children,
NEWSWEEK, Feb. 12, 1990, at 62 (describing the same). But see Linda C. Mayes et al., The Problem of
Prenatal Cocaine Exposure: A Rush to Judgment, 267 JAMA 406, 406-07 (1992) (characterizing evi-
dence about long term effects of crack on child growth and development as "slim and fragmented" due
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mothers for such crimes as child abuse, child endangerment, and
delivery of a controlled substance to a minor.5 Many of these
prosecutions were made as a result of hospital cooperation with
local law enforcement officials.6 The usual scenario consisted of
hospital personnel collecting a urine sample from an unsuspect-
ing pregnant mother during a hospital visit, testing it for drugs
without her consent and reporting a positive result to local law
enforcement. 7 Criminal prosecution inevitably followed. In some
cases, incarceration could only be avoided if the patient agreed,
under threat by the hospital, to undergo drug treatment.8 Some
states have since abandoned this vindictive method of prosecu-
tion,9 and rather follow the suggestion of public health organiza-
tions to abandon fetal abuse criminal convictions. 10 Instead, some
states have adopted other methods such as preventative educa-
to small samples, lack of control of conflicting variables, among other factors); Kimani Paul-Emile, The
Charleston Policy: Substance or Abuse?, 4 MICH. J. RACE & L. 325, 354 (1999) (listing numerous stud-
ies and articles concluding early studies were flawed and stating journals refused to publish studies
coming to contrary conclusions about cocaine's effects); Dana Kennedy, Experts: Children Born Ad-
dicted to Crack Rise Above Dire Predictions, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 5, 1992, available in 1992 WL
5328389 (discussing programs for crack exposed children that have demonstrated great improvement).
5 See Margaret P. Spencer, Prosecutorial Immunity: The Response to Prenatal Drug Use, 25
CONN. L. REv. 393,394 (1993) (stating that as of 1993, 180 American women have been arrested for
offenses relating to drug use during pregnancy); see also Paul-Emile, supra note 4, at 326-27 (describ-
ing policy in Charleston, South Carolina in which drug using pregnant women were arrested and prose-
cuted). See generally VanRaalte, supra note 3, at 451 (commenting on negative effects of such poli-
cies).
6 The Charleston policy was designed in conjunction with the local police department and
required release of positive drug test results to authorities. Paul-Emile, supra note 4, at 326-27; see also
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 75-83 (2001) (discussing applicability of fourth amend-
ment to unauthorized drug screenings); Spencer, supra note 5, at 407-08 (questioning policy that creates
fear in pregnant women and discourages them from seeking medical treatment).
7 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 75-83 (discussing state hospital policy in Charleston which re-
quired release of positive drug test results to local solicitor and local police department).
8 See Paul-Emile, supra note 4, at 327 (discussing Charleston policy giving option of treat-
ment over criminal prosecution once pregnant woman tests positive for cocaine); see also Ferguson,
532 U.S. at 1286 (stating women who failed to comply with the treatment program's terms or tested
positive for cocaine while in the program were arrested); Spencer, supra note 5, at 402-03 (discussing
the pitfalls of assuring prosecutorial immunity in retum for participation in drug treatment program).
9 See Commonwealth v. Welch, 864 S.W.2d 280, 284 (Ky. 1993) (stating "[public health]
experts unanimously oppose prosecution for prenatal abuse"); see also Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 83-87
(holding nonconsensual urine screenings violate Fourth Amendment). But see Whitner v. South Caro-
lina, 492 S.E.2d 777, 786 (S.C. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1145 (1998) (holding Whitner's child
abuse and endangerment prosecution for using crack after her fetus attained viability did not violate her
right of privacy).
10 See Committee on Substance Abuse, Drug-Exposed Infants, 86 PEDIATRICS 639, 640
(1990) (describing California District Attorney's announcement of his intention to prosecute all mothers
of newborns with illegal drugs found in their urine); see also Mayes et al., supra note 4, at 408; Law &
Medicine/Board of Trustees Representative, Legal Interventions During Pregnancy, 264 JAMA 2663,
2668 (1990) (concluding judicial intervention is rarely appropriate when pregnant woman makes in-
formed refusal of treatment).
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tion, early intervention, and effective treatment programs."
Many argue that problems arise in such prosecutions because
they run counter to the legislative intent of these criminal stat-
utes. 12 Moreover, such prosecutions run contrary to the lenity
principle, namely the idea that courts are reluctant to expand the
reach of a criminal statute without a clear legislative intent to do
so. 13 In an effort to apply the criminal statutes to prosecute pre-
natal drug use by pregnant women, trial courts originally en-
gaged in expansive interpretation of these criminal statutes, con-
struing the word "child" in child abuse and neglect statutes to
include fetuses. 14 Such convictions have usually been successfully
overturned by state appellate courts15 due to the aforementioned
" See Spencer, supra note 5, at 402 (explaining that harmful consequences of punitive sanc-
tions could be avoided if pregnant mothers are given opportunity to participate in prenatal treatment
programs and receive assurance of prosecutorial immunity upon the successful completion of such pro-
grams). But see Michelle D. Mills, Comment, Fetal Abuse Prosecutions: The Triumph of Reaction Over
Reason, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 989, 998 (1998) (noting that in spite of these alternatives, no state has im-
plemented treatment schemes that prohibit civil commitment or criminal sanctions all together). See
generally Heather Flynn Bell, In Utero Endangerment and Public Heath: Prosecution v. Treatment, 36
TULSA L.J. 649, 668 (2001) (opining that public health officials should focus on the alternative treat-
ment programs that work and thereby avoid criminal prosecutions).
12 See Sheriff, Washoe County, Nev. v. Encoe, 885 P.2d 596, 598 (Nev. 1994) (purporting
that to interpret state's statute to allow for criminal prosecution of mothers who ingest an illegal sub-
stance while pregnant was not the legislature's intent); see also Welch, 864 S.W.2d at 282 (citing the
opinion of Court of Appeals, which stated "[tihe courts cannot presume a legislative intent to expand
the class of persons treatable as victims of criminal activity"); State v. Gethers, 585 So. 2d 1140, 1141-
42 (Fla. Ct. App. 1991) (asserting that the amended language of the statute eliminated provisions au-
thorizing the criminal prosecution of mother who gives birth to drug addicted child); Mills, supra note
1I, at 994-95 (stating courts who overturned fetal abuse convictions found that legislatures did not in-
tend to protect fetuses under child abuse statutes).
13 See People v. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50, 52 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) (stating "It is well settled
that penal statutes are strictly construed, absent a legislative statement to the contrary"); see also People
v. Gilbert, 324 N.W.2d 834, 844 (Mich. 1982) (noting "[a] court should not place a tenuous construc-
tion on [a] statute to address a problem to which legislative attention is readily directed and which it can
readily resolve if in its judgment it is an appropriate subject of legislation"); William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Formalism and Statutory Interpretation: Norms, Empiricism, and Canons in Statutory Interpretation,
666 U. CHI. L. REv. 671, 679 (1999) (explaining that even if the legislative readers do not follow the
rule of lenity, the courts can induce this convention by putting the legislature on notice that the rule of
lenity will be applied in statutory interpretation).
'" See Louise Marlene Chan, S.O.S from the Womb: A Callfor New York Legislation Crimi-
nalizing Drug Use During Pregnancy, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 199, 201-202 (1993) (reporting over 160
criminal proceedings through the end of 1992 involving pregnant women consuming drugs); see also
Mills, supra note 11, at 990-91 (reporting more than 200 women in 30 different jurisdictions since the
early 1980's have been prosecuted for ingesting drugs while pregnant, claiming anywhere from 50 to
180 such criminal prosecutions occurred through the early 1990's); Lynn Smith, Punish or Protect?,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1996 at El (reporting that over 200 women in 30 states have been arrested and
charged for ingesting drugs while carrying fetus).
"5 See Veronique Mistiaen, Legal Haze: Is Drug Use During Pregnancy Child Abuse?, CHI.
TRIB., Oct. 11, 1992, at I (stating that by the late 1980's, 167 women had been convicted of fetal abuse,
21 of whom appealed and had their convictions successfully overturned); see also Reyes v. People, 75
Cal. App. 3d 214, 219-220 (Ct. App. 1977) (describing one of the first cases to successfully overturn
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legal concern of contrary legislative intent. In addition, concerns
of more attractive, effective and harsher alternatives to prosecu-
tion (such as treatment and prevention programs), as well as the
concern of possible invalidation of such laws on void-for-
vagueness grounds have resulted in reversal of such convic-
tions. 16 In response, courts have begun to rely on a legal fiction,
construing the words "delivery" or "distribution," in state stat-
utes criminalizing distribution of a controlled substance to a mi-
nor, to include the mother transmitting drugs to her child
through the umbilical cord before it is severed, shortly after de-
livery. 17 Concerns of contrary legislative intent and lack of notice
arise from such construction by the courts.' 8
conviction of pregnant heroin user prosecuted for felony child endangerment after trial court concluded
that word "child" included fetus). But see Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 786-78 (1997) (upholding conviction
of pregnant mother under child endangerment statute).
16 See Mills, supra note 11, at 1020 (opining that most courts hearing fetal abuse prosecution
cases have recognized constitutional problems of notice and vagueness when women are charged under
child abuse or drug delivery statutes); see also Welch, 864 S.W.2d at 283 (holding statutory construc-
tion of child abuse statute to include injury to fetuses would be impermissibly vague); see, e.g., Reine-
sto v. Superior Court, 894 P.2d 733 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that if the court were to interpret the
statute as including use of drugs during pregnancy, notions of due process and fundamental fairness
would render the statute impermissibly vague); State v. Kruzicki, 541 N.W.2d 482, 488 (Wis. Ct. App.
1995) (describing that courts begin with statutory language itself, and if it is clear, the courts are pre-
cluded from using any other extrinsic sources to aid in their interpretation); Encoe, 885 P.2d at 598
(stating this court recognizes that due process prohibits them from interpreting laws in any unforesee-
able or unintended manner); Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288, 1294 (Fla. 1992) (suggesting that inter-
pretation of delivery of controlled substance statute to cover ingestion by pregnant woman would be
radical incursion upon existing law); State v. Carter, 602 So. 2d 995 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992); State v.
Luster, 419 S.E.2d 32, 34 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (asserting courts, in absence of statutory interpretation
precedent, must assign to the terms "delivery" and "distribute" their ordinary meanings); State v. Gray,
584 N.E.2d 710, 712 (Ohio 1992) (finding the word child was not intended to refer to unborn child and
that petitioners' prenatal conduct does not constitute felonious child endangering within contemplation
of the statute); Gethers, 585 So.2d at 1141; Hardy, 469 N.W.2d at 52 (noting court's primary goal in
interpreting statutes is to ascertain and give effect legislature's intent); Reyes, 75 Cal. App. 3d at 218
(asserting that if the statute were interpreted as being applicable to endangering fetus, it would result in
absurdity of endangering life of fetus being more punishable than aborting it).
17 See Mills, supra note 11, at 995 (describing this legal fiction and stating that such attempts
at prosecution were also unsuccessful, despite avoiding defining fetus as child); see, e.g. Johnson, 602
So. 2d at 1290 (claiming that the lack of legislative intent along with uncertainty of the term "delivery"
compels the court to construe the statute in favor of the defendant); Encoe, 885 P.2d at 598 (holding
that prosecuting mother for delivery of controlled substance to child in utero is strained and unforeseen
application of the child abuse statute); Gray, 584 N.E.2d at 712 (claiming that relationship between us-
ing controlled substance when pregnant and the statute was so tenuous that the court could not infer,
absent unmistakable legislative intent, that legislature intended it to apply).
18 See Mills, supra note 11, at 995 (asserting that courts have determined prosecutions using
drug delivery statutes provide insufficient notice and are contrary to legislative intent); see, e.g. John-
son, 602 So. 2d at 1296 (asserting that if it is legislative intent to make such conduct criminal, they
should redraft the bill to clearly address problem of passing illegal substances from mother to child in
utero, not just in the birthing process); Hardy, 469 N.W.2d at 55 (opining that it is unreasonable to
charge pregnant women with delivery of controlled substances when the ingestion of the drugs occurred
when she had no reason to know birth would occur within hours from the time she uses)..
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Such prosecutions arouse concerns not only of contrary legisla-
tive intent, but also concerns of infringement on certain constitu-
tionally guaranteed rights, including the right to reproductive
privacy, 19 the right to maintain confidentiality of medical re-
cords,20 the right to be free from illegal searches and seizures, 21
the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, 22 the
right to equal protection of the laws, 23 and the procedural due
19 See Paul-Emile, supra note 4, at 384 (finding under this policy women are prosecuted for
exercising their constitutionally protected right to procreate); Mills, supra note 11, at 1020 (noting laws
that punish women for behavior affecting their fetus should be examined with Supreme Court abortion
cases in mind being these are "only statements about a pregnant woman's obligation to her unborn
child.. .); see also infra Part IlI.A.2 (discussing constitutional privacy right). See generally Cary v.
Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-685 (1977) (including within right of privacy created by
courts is right to make decisions related to marriage and procreation); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713
(1976) (denying respondent's claim because disclosure of his arrest did not fall into fundamental consti-
tutionally protected rights like matters relating to marriage and procreation); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married
or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamental... as the de-
cision whether to bear or beget a child"); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-485 (1965) (ex-
trapolating zones of privacy from penumbras within Bill of Rights, among them being fundamental
right to marry and procreate).
20 See Paul-Emile, supra note 4, at 367 (finding "criminalization of prenatal drug addiction
forces health care providers [to breach] patient confidentiality..."); see also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S.
589, 599-600 (1977) (stating individuals possess constitutional "interest in avoiding disclosure of per-
sonal matters," applying standard to disclosure of patient medical records); Daniel N. Abrahamson et
al., Amicus Curiae Brief: Cornella Whitner v. The State of California, 9 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 139,
141 (1998) (making light of dilemma facing health care providers to either risk jail or uphold patient
confidentiality).
2i See Paul-Emile, supra note 4, at 363-366 (discussing toxicology screening of pregnant
women done without their consent and without their knowledge, and conducted for law enforcement
purposes); infra Part I.B. 1, Il.A, and accompanying text (discussing analysis and issues involved in
constitutional violation based on illegal search and seizure); see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV (prohibit-
ing unreasonable search and seizures by government). See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22
(1968) (requiring articulable suspicion of criminal activity for law enforcement officers to initiate inves-
tigatory detention, and balancing of the governmental interest as against level of intrusion).
22 See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (prohibiting infliction of cruel and unusual punishment);
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (holding addiction cannot be basis for criminal prose-
cution under Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment); Paul-Emile, su-
pra note 4, at 373 (concluding that because drug addition is a disease, punishing pregnant women for
substance abuse runs afoul of "well-established principle that imposition of criminal penalties for one's
status violates Eighth Amendment to Constitution"); infra Part II1.E and accompanying text (discussing
cruel and unusual punishment as it applies to fetal abuse prosecution).
23 See Jean Reith Schroedel, et al, Women's Rights and Fetal Personhood in Criminal Law, 7
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 89, 104 (2000) (suggesting Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
should not be strictly applied to pregnant women who would potentially harm their fetus because they
comprise class separate from non-pregnant women and constraints on fundamental rights should not be
applied based on that class); Mills, supra note 11, at 1028 (arguing fetal abuse prosecutions may dis-
criminate on basis of gender and race); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (stating "[n]o State
shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws"); infra Part III.F (dis-
cussing equal protection issues and analysis as they relate to Charleston's policy).
2002]
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process right of notice with regard to the criminality of an act. 24
Some of the earlier cases before the courts, however, were de-
cided on statutory interpretation grounds alone. 25 In one recent
case, Ferguson v. City of Charleston,26 the Fourth Circuit upheld
the constitutionality of a typical program involving the prosecu-
tion of pregnant drug users after addressing the constitutional
issues of search and seizure, privacy with respect to disclosure of
medical records, and lack of notice. 27 The United States Supreme
Court reversed the Fourth Circuit, holding that "a state hospi-
tal's performance of a diagnostic test to obtain evidence of a pa-
tient's criminal conduct for law enforcement purposes was an un-
reasonable search if the patient has not consented to the
procedure."2 8 Also, more narrowly, the Court reached that con-
clusion by reasoning that the interest in using the threat of
criminal sanctions to deter pregnant women from using cocaine
could not justify a departure from the general rule that an official
nonconsensual search was unconstitutional if not authorized by a
valid warrant. 29
This note will focus on the constitutional issues concerning the
aforementioned methods used to criminally prosecute pregnant
women who use drugs. Part I of this note will discuss the policy
24 See infra Part IV (discussing the lack of procedural due process afforded women held
criminally liable for drug use during pregnancy); see also U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV (both providing
that "persons shall not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law").
25 See Mills, supra note I1, at 994 (opining that "broad wording of child abuse...statutes
alarmed courts" and such statutes should not be used to prosecute pregnant women without requisite
legislative intent); see also Sheriff Washoe County Nevada v. Encoe, 885 P.2d 596, 599 (Nev. 1994)
(concluding legislature did not intend to criminally prosecute prenatal drug use as state's interest would
be better served by making treatment programs available); Ohio v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710, 711 (1992)
(construing statutory language literally to find words "parent" and "child" within their common usage
not to proscribe substance abuse occurring before birth); Reyes v. People, 75 Cal. App. 3d 214,passim
(Ct. App. 1977) (determining due to various rational meanings when legislature speaks of "such child"
within statute, term plainly excluded unborn children and therefore petitioner's prenatal conduct did not
constitute felonious child endangering).
26 186 F.3d 469 (4th Cir. 1999), rev'd by Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 532
U.S. 67 (2001).
27 See infra Part It (discussing Fourth Circuit's analysis on these issues).
28 See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. at 69. See generally Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J
v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 646 (1995) (using balancing test to determine whether state's interest in pre-
venting drug addiction among students outweighed student athletes' expectation of privacy); National
Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 656 (1989) (using balancing test to determine whether
intrusive drug testing of employees required to carry firearms outweighed those employees' privacy
interests).
29 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 84-85; see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 436 (1966) (presuming an effective waiver cannot be achieved by silence; rather, it requires
the accused to refuse constitutional rights after being informed of them).
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that was implemented in a Charleston hospital to prosecute
pregnant women who tested positive for drug use, the very same
policy that was constitutionally challenged in Ferguson. Part II
will discuss the Fourth Circuit's analysis of the case's constitu-
tional claims, which led to an erroneous conclusion that the drug
testing in a hospital for use in criminal prosecution in a hospital
did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Part III will discuss the
Supreme Court's reversal of the Fourth Circuit, as well as the
Court's constitutional analysis of the case. Part IV will further
discuss the constitutional holdings in the case, as well as other
constitutional concerns raised by such prosecutions. Moreover,
this note will propose that South Carolina adopt other means of
addressing the problem of drug use among pregnant women-
means that are aimed at prevention rather than punishment-a
route that many other states have already begun to explore. This
note will also show that such prosecutions only serve to perpetu-
ate an already strong public distrust in law enforcement, as well
as increase this sense of mistrust in the doctor-patient relation-
ship, an area in which the patient's trust is of paramount impor-
tance. As a result of such outrageous programs, the prevalence
of drug use among pregnant women, arguably, will continue, and
not only perpetuate the problem of drug use among pregnant
women, but also serve to exacerbate the problem. Mothers will
be forced to refrain from seeking medical care for fear of criminal
prosecution, leading to a nearly impossible choice between two
evils; namely, risking dire consequences to her baby's health, or
terminating her pregnancy, effectively infringing upon her con-
stitutionally protected right to procreation.
THE CHARLESTON HOSPITAL'S POLICY
At the suggestion of a nurse at a local hospital in downtown
Charleston, the Medical University of South Carolina ("MUSC"),
in conjunction with the Solicitor of the Ninth Judicial Circuit of
South Carolina, the City of Charleston, the City of Charleston
Police Department ("CCPD"), and various social services agen-
cies, implemented a policy of prosecuting pregnant women who
tested positive for cocaine use.30 The policy was implemented in
30 See Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 474; see also The House Committee on Government Reform
and Oversight Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs and Criminal Justice, 105th
2002]
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the Fall of 1989 after a meeting of the aforementioned parties,
during which the Solicitor informed the others that a viable fetus
was a "person" under state law, and that as a result, a woman
who ingested cocaine at her 24th week of pregnancy could be
charged with distribution of a controlled substance to a minor.3
The actual policy consisted of collecting a urine sample from a
pregnant woman who came into the hospital when certain "indi-
cia" of cocaine use were present.32 The hospital then tested the
sample for cocaine, and any positive result was reported to the
Charleston Police Department or a representative of the Solici-
tor's office, and the woman was subsequently arrested for dis-
tributing cocaine to a minor, often shortly after giving birth.33
The policy was amended in 1990 to give women who tested posi-
tive the option of entering a drug treatment program, after which
positive test results were initially withheld from local law en-
forcement. 34 Upon rejection of the drug treatment option, arrest
inevitably followed. 35 Even if the women elected to undergo
Cong. (1998), reprinted in FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, Jul. 23, 1998 (Statement of Charles M. Condon,
South Carolina's Attorney General, justifying South Carolina's policy); Philip H. Jos et al., The
Charleston Policy on Cocaine Use During Pregnancy: A Cautionary Tale, 23 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 120
(1995) (illustrating further details on Charleston's policy).
31 See Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 474; see also Distribution to Persons Under Eighteen, S.C.
CODE ANN. § 44-53-440 (Law. Co-op. 1997) (establishing felony to distribute narcotics, LSD, or co-
caine, to any person under the age of eighteen, punishable by up to twenty years in prison and up to
thirty thousand dollar fine); Arlene Levinson, S.C. Law on Crack Moms May Be Heard in High Court,
HERALD (Rock Hill, S.C.), Mar. 15, 1998, at I A (arguing that South Carolina Attorney General justified
the action because fetus's rights stem not from the mother, but from God).
32 See Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 474 (listing factors as: (1) separation of the placenta from the
uterine wall, (2) intrauterine fetal death, (3) no prenatal care, (4) late prenatal care (beginning after 24
weeks), (5) incomplete prenatal care (fewer than five visits), (6) preterm labor without obvious cause,
(7) history of cocaine use, (8) unexplained birth defects, or (9) intrauterine growth retardation without
obvious cause); see also Theodore Slotkin, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, June, 16, 1998, at A30
(pointing out the hypocrisy of South Carolina's arrest policy for mothers exposing fetuses to cocaine,
while it's major crop, tobacco, is a more severe cause of the enumerated factors).
33 See Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 474; see also Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 72 (stating there were two
protocols in place before the 1990 amendment which provided treatments as alternatives: the first in-
volved women who tested positive for drug use during pregnancy and the second involved those who
tested positive shortly after giving birth; former protocol required police notification only if woman
missed appointment with substance abuse counselor or tested positive second time and latter protocol
required immediate police notification, soon after which patient was arrested); Levinson, supra note 31,
at Al (noting Ms. Whitner was arrested within one day of giving birth); Bob Herbert, In America;
Pregnancy and Addiction, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1998, at A31 (reporting that 30 women were arrested
in shackles, some still bleeding from delivery).
34 See Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 474. See generally, Dawn Johnsen, From Driving to Drugs:
Governmental Regulation of Pregnant Women's Lives After Webster, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 179, 214-15
(1989) (stating that prison is sometimes only available treatment for drug addicts); South Carolina Pro-
gram for Mothers Takes Creative Approach, ALCOHOLISM & DRUG ABUSE WEEK, Feb. 27, 1995 at 3
(showing the beginnings of community support for female addicts' unique needs).
35 See Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 474.
[Vol. 16:767
PROSECUTNG PREGNANT WOMEN FOR DRUG USE
treatment, arrest would ultimately result upon any failure to fol-
low treatment guidelines of a subsequent positive drug test re-
sult.3 6
Patients who entered the hospital were required to sign several
forms. The City argued these forms constituted "consent" with
respect to the search or the testing of their urine.37 However, the
decision of the Fourth Circuit did not base its decision on
whether consent had been obtained. Rather, it reasoned that be-
cause the search served a "special need" of the government, nei-
ther consent, probable cause, nor a warrant were required to
make the search constitutional once the "special needs" balancing
test was conducted. 38
The city claimed that the intent of the policy was to encourage
pregnant women who used cocaine to obtain substance abuse
counseling, as well as to protect the unborn fetus. 39 However,
heart-wrenching and horrendous depictions of such arrests dic-
tate a contrary conclusion. There were episodes in which women,
still weak, vomiting, and bleeding heavily after childbirth, were
shackled and taken into holding cells for hours on end, separated
from their babies and unable to contact family members to care
for the newborn. 40 In all, thirty women were arrested, all of
36 See Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 474.
37 See Paul-Emile, supra note 4, at 365 n.178 (arguing tested women did not give their con-
sent, and therefore, search warrant or probable cause were required to make testing lawful); see also
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (holding that even without warrant or probable
cause, government may conduct search based on consent, resulting in waiver of Fourth Amendment
rights); Gorman v. United States, 380 F.2d 158, 163 (lst Cir. 1967) (stating consent must be "unequivo-
cal, specific and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion").
38 See Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 479 (concluding that balancing of these factors demonstrates
that such searches were reasonable and not violative of the Fourth Amendment); see also Chandler v.
Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 318-19 (1997) (stating that testing method will not be intrusive if special needs
showing has been made); James Drago, Note, One For My Baby, One More for the Road: Legislation
and Counseling to Prevent Prenatal Exposure to Alcohol, 7 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 163, 176 (2001)
(stating Ferguson decision held that drug testing of pregnant mother's urine was not unconstitutional
because the testing was justified by "special need beyond normal law enforcement goals").
39 See Paul-Emile, supra note 4, at 326 (describing that policy's intent was to help endan-
gered children and deter pregnant women from self-destructive behavior); see also Ferguson, 532 U.S.
at 73 (noting policy "made no mention of any change in the prenatal care of such patients, nor did it
prescribe any special treatment for the newborns"); Bryony J. Gagan, Ferguson v. City of Charleston,
South Carolina: "Fetal Abuse ", Drug Testing and the Fourth Amendment, 53 STAN. L. REv. 491,494
(2000) (detailing the prosecutor's argument that testing without warrant, probable cause, or consent was
justified by the need to protect the fetus).
40 See Paul-Emile, supra note 4, at 328-329 (depicting more of these arrests); see also Sandi
J. Toll, Note, For My Doctor's Eyes Only: Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 267,
297 n.231 (2001) (recounting Lori Griffin's experience of being handcuffed and shackled to the bed
during examinations while she was still bleeding from childbirth). See generally Ferguson, 532 U.S. at
90 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (recognizing the use of handcuffs, arrests, prosecutions and police assis-
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whom were African American except one woman, who was noted
to have a "Negro boyfriend" on her medical records. 41
FOURTH CIRCUIT'S FAULTY ANALYSIS IN FERGUSON V. CITY OF
CHARLESTON
Ten women who were tested under the policy, nine of whom
had actually been arrested, brought suit in the District Court in
Georgia against the hospital, its medical personnel, the state so-
licitor, the city and state police. The plaintiffs claimed that the
testing of their urine for evidence of cocaine use was a violation
of the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures and a violation of their constitutional right
to privacy. 42
The Majority's Opinion
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution pro-
vides that "people have the right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures" and that warrants are only to be issued
upon probable cause. 43 The Fourth Circuit found that the war-
rantless testing of urine of pregnant women, when the "indicia"44
tance in designing and implementing the Medical University of South Carolina's testing and rehabilita-
tion policy); Leading Case, 115 HARV. L. REV. 326, 332 n.53 (2001).
4' See Brief for Appellants at 23, Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 186 F.3d 469 (4th Cir.
1998) (No. 97-2512); see also Gagan, supra note 39, at 498 (noting that white mother's chart indicated
that she had black boyfriend); Leading Case, supra note 40, at 335 n.75 (citing Brief for Petitioner
which detailed fact that patient's boyfriend was black was denoted on patient's chart).
42 See Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 473-74; see also Jennifer Mott Johnson, Note, Reproductive
Ability for Sale, Do I Hear $200 - Private Cash for Contraception Agreements as an Alternative to Ma-
ternal Substance Abuse, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 205, 216 (explaining claims of the ten female plaintiffs in
Ferguson); Toll, supra note 40, at 267 (stating that in 1993 ten women challenged Medical University
of South Carolina's MUSC policy of testing suspected drug using expectant mothers' urine as violating
their Fourth Amendment rights).
" See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (providing "[tihe right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized"); see also Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643, 655 (1965) (making Fourth Amendment applicable to states by means of Fourteenth
Amendment's due process clause). See generally Douglas K. Yatter, et al., Twenty-Ninth Annual Re-
view of Criminal Procedure, Warrantless Searches and Seizures, 88 GEO. L. J. 912 (2000) (providing
comprehensive study and analysis Fourth Amendment search and seizure jurisprudence).
"See Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 474 (listing policy's "indicia" of drug use); see also Johnson,
supra note 42, at 216 n.81 (listing the indicia of drug use under the MUSC testing policy); Lina
McMeans-Muloway, Notes and Comments, Should the Drug Testing of Pregnant Women Fall Within
the "Special Needs" Exception to the Warrant Requirement? An Examination of Ferguson Et Al. v.
City of Charleston, S.C. Et Al., 3 J. LEGAL ADVOC. & PRAC. 59, 60 (2001) (noting the indicia of co-
caine use that MUSC looked for).
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of possible cocaine use were present, constituted a reasonable
"special need" search 45 that did not violate the Fourth Amend-
ment.4
6
In reaching this conclusion, the court referred to the Fourth
Amendment requirement that governmental intrusions into pri-
vacy by means of searches and seizures be reasonable. 47 Recog-
nizing that neither a warrant nor probable cause is an indispen-
sable element of reasonableness, 48 it concluded that this was a
situation in which a Fourth Amendment intrusion served a spe-
cial governmental need, beyond the normal need for law en-
forcement. 49 Accordingly, it used the National Treasury Employ-
ees Union v. Von Raa 5 ° balancing test of weighing the
governmental interest justifying invasion against the degree of
the intrusion on the privacy of the individual.5' The court listed
the considerations to be taken into account in this balancing test,
as enunciated in Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz.52 the gov-
ernmental interest, the effectiveness of the intrusion (i.e., degree
to which intrusion reasonably is thought to advance the govern-
mental interest), and the magnitude of the intrusion upon the
individuals affected (from both a subjective and objective stand-
4
1 See New Jersey v. T.L.O, 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (stating
there are limited exceptions to probable cause requirement, in which balancing test of reasonableness
consists of weighing government against private interests, but that test should only be applied "in those
exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make
the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable...") (Emphasis added.); see also Vemonia
Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-54 (1995) (upholding suspicionless drug testing of high
school students participating in inter-scholastic athletics as "special needs" search); National Treasury
Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66 (1989) (using "special needs doctrine" in upholding
Customs Service regulation that employees wanting transfer or promotion submit to drug test); Skinner
v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989) (applying special needs doctrine in up-
holding drug tests for railway employees involved in train accidents); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 482 U.S.
868, 873 (1987) (concluding that in limited circumstances, search unsupported by either warrant or
probable cause can be constitutional when "special needs" other than normal need for law enforcement
provide sufficient justification); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 720 (1987) (plurality opinion)
(adopting "special needs" terminology). But see Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 318 (1997) (striking
down drug testing of candidates for state office as not falling within "special needs" exception). See
generally Michael Book, Comment, Group Suspicion: The Key to Evaluating Student Drug Testing, 48
U. KAN. L. REV. 637 (2000) (discussing special needs test and relevant constitutional concerns).46 See Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 479.
41 See id. at 476.
48 Id.
49 id.
"' 489 U.S. 656 (1989). There, the Court upheld Customs Service regulation requiring em-
ployees who wanted to transfer or those who wanted a promotion to submit to drug test. Id., at 665-66.
" See Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 476.
52 See Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990) (involving
reasonableness of automobile sobriety checkpoints, which are seizures, not searches).
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point).53
The Fourth Circuit saw the governmental interest as reducing
the alarmingly high number of pregnancies affected by cocaine
use, the associated pregnancy complications, in addition to reduc-
ing the resulting financial drain on public resources resulting
from caring for such infants. 54 The court identified the effective-
ness factor as the degree to which it advanced the public interest,
and concluded that the testing of the mother's urine when certain
indicia were present was an effective way of identifying the
women to be treated, while at the same time saving limited hos-
pital resources. 55 Finally, the court characterized the degree of
intrusion on these women as "minimal" in that the collection of
urine samples in a hospital setting is common. 56
On the constitutional privacy claim, the Fourth Circuit also
concluded that any privacy interest the appellants possessed was
outweighed by a compelling governmental interest, particularly
in light of the nonpublic nature of the disclosure.57 In reaching
this conclusion, the court noted that a generalized right to pri-
vacy does not exist.58 Moreover, the court noted that even if such
a right to privacy in nondisclosure of medical records did exist,
the governmental interest in disclosing them outweighed any
53 See Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 476.
14 See id. at 477-78.
55 See id. at 478 (explaining that testing of mother's urine enabled identification of women to
be treated while conserving limited medical resources); see also Major Michael R. Stahlman, New De-
velopments in Search and Seizure: A Little Bit of Everything, 2001 ARMY LAW. 20, 33 (2001) (stating
purpose for collecting mother's urine was for treatment); Johnson, supra note 42, at 216 n.88 (2001)
(noting testing of mother's urine pushes women into treatment).
56 See Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 479 (stating collection of mother's urine during hospital visit is
minimally intrusive); see also Theodore P. Metzler et al., Comment, Thirtieth Annual Review of Crimi-
nal Procedure: Introduction and Guide for Users: I. Investigation and Police Practices: Warrantless
Searches and Seizures, 89 GEO. L.J. 1084, 1156-57 n.349 (arguing collection of urine specimen during
medical visit is "minimally intrusive"); Yatter, supra note 43, at 983-84 n.352 (explaining "special
needs" testing of pregnancy cocaine users in medical exam setting is "minimally intrusive").
57 See Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 482 (noting test results were only disclosed to limited number
of law enforcement, and were not disclosed to MUSC, Solicitor's Office, or public); see also Catherine
Louisa Glenn, Note, Protecting Health Information Privacy: The Case for Self-Regulation of Electroni-
cally Held Medical Records, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1605, 1620 (2000) (commenting appellant's privacy
interest in non-disclosure of their medical records is outweighed by governmental interest); cf Jacque-
line R. Williams, Note, A Well Deserved Upper-Cut to Fetal Abuse: Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 26
S.U. L. REv. 187, 192 (2001) (stating privacy interest of mother's is outweighed by governmental inter-
est).
58 See Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 482 (citing Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453 (4th Cir.1998)
(discussing that Supreme Court has only recognized privacy interest in certain areas, such as "matters of
reproduction, contraception, abortion, and marriage")); see also Glenn, supra note 57, at 1610 n.36 (ex-
plaining there is no generalized Constitutional right to privacy); Williams, supra note 57, at 190 (stating
there is no generalized right to privacy in Constitution).
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such interest.59
Judge Blake's Partial Dissent
District Judge Blake, at the trial level, submitted a dissenting
opinion in which he criticized the majority's holding that there
was no Fourth Amendment infringement. 60 He reached his con-
clusion on the Fourth Amendment claim based on his conclusion
that the record reflected that the hospital policy was not imple-
mented for the purpose of protecting the health of fetuses carried
by drug using mothers, as the City of Charleston claimed, but
rather for the purpose of prosecuting these women.6' Judge Blake
pointed to evidence that law enforcement officials were involved
in the implementation of the program from the very beginning.
Specifically, he referred to a letter from MUSC General Counsel
to the Charleston solicitor illustrating this point. 62 He also noted
the operational guidelines issued by the Captain of Charleston
Police which referred to a positive test result as "probable cause"
5' See Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 482-83 (citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (recogniz-
ing that although Whalen involved disclosure of medical records, the United States Supreme Court has
never recognized such a constitutionally guaranteed right)); see also Glenn, supra note 57, at 1620 (ex-
plaining that even if appellants had constitutional interest in privacy of their medical records, it is out-
weighed by governmental interest). Compare Doe v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 72 F.3d 1133,
1137 (3d Cir. 1995) (recognizing that individuals have that type of constitutional privacy right) with
Jarvis v. Wellman, 52 F.3d 125, 126 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding no such right exists).
60 See Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 484 (Blake, J., dissenting); Nicole F. DiMaria, Note, Fourth
Amendment - Search and Seizure - Urinalysis Drug Screenings Performed by State Hospital Without a
Warrant Fall Within the "Special Needs" Exception to the Warrant Requirement - Ferguson v. City of
Charleston, 186 F.3d 469 (4th Cir, 1999), 11 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 121, 141 (2000) (explaining
dissenting Judge Blake would have reversed based on Fourth Amendment claim); Toll, supra note 40,
at 301-02 (noting Judge Blake's disagreement with majority based on Fourth Amendment).
61 See Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 484 (Blake, J., dissenting) (arguing Fourth Amendment claim
implements policy to prosecute mothers rather than to help fetus); see also McMeans-Muloway, supra
note 44, at 65 (noting Judge Blake's contention that MUSC's policy had prosecutorial purpose); Toll,
supra note 40, at 301-02 (stating Judge Blake viewed the program as prosecutorial from inception).
62 The letter stated:
I read with great interest in Saturday's newspaper accounts of our good
friend the Solicitor for the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, prosecuting mothers
who gave birth to children who tested positive for drugs... Please advise
us if your office is anticipating future criminal action and what if anything
our Medical Center needs to do to assist you in this matter.
Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 484 (Blake, J., dissenting); see also Toll, supra note 40, at 302 n.267
(explaining Judge Blake relied on said letter and voted to reverse district court based on
prosecutorial nature of program); Carmen Vaughn, Note, Circumventing the Fourth
Amendment via the Special Needs Doctrine to Prosecute Pregnant Drug Users: Ferguson v.
City of Charleston, 51 S.C. L. REV. 671, 681 n.98 (2000) (noting Judge Blake relied upon
said letter to show the prosecutorial nature of program).
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for arrest of the mother.63 The guidelines provided that women
up to 27 weeks pregnant were to be charged with possession of a
controlled substance (a much lesser crime), whereas women at 28
weeks or more were to be charged with both possession and dis-
tribution of a controlled substance. 64
Furthermore, he distinguished Sitz, upon which the majority
relied in applying the "special needs" balancing test, in that it in-
volved individuals who had consented to drug testing,65 or in-
volved drug testing not conducted for the purpose of criminal
prosecution.66 Moreover, he distinguished those cases involving a
special needs exception as only relevant to the initial seizure,
which turned out to be minimally intrusive in those cases. 67 He
characterized any search of the person, conducted for the purpose
of criminal prosecution, as still requiring either probable cause or
consent. 68
In this case, however, the patients' consent was not obtained,
nor was the testing based on probable cause. Subjective criteria,
the alleged "indicia of cocaine use" were used, resulting in a great
deal of discretion in selection of who was to be tested. 69 There
was a greatly disproportionate treatment of drug-using pregnant
women based on their race, as evidenced by the fact that African
Americans were treated to an arrest, while Caucasians were af-
forded drug treatment in all but one situation.70
63 See Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 484 (Blake, J., dissenting) (noting Judge Blake's use of opera-
tional guidelines as "probable cause" to arrest mother).
64 See Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 484 (Blake, J., dissenting); see also State v. Home, 319 S.E.2d
703, 704 (S.C. 1984) (stating viable fetus is considered person under South Carolina law); Whitner v.
South Carolina, 492 S.E.2d 777, 777 (S.C. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1145 (1998) (upholding con-
viction for criminal child neglect in case involving woman who ingested cocaine while pregnant with
viable fetus). See generally Distribution to Persons Under Eighteen, S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-440
(Law. Co-op. 1997) (criminalizing cocaine distribution to persons under the age of eighteen).
65 See Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 476-78 (citing National Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489
U.S. 656, 656 (1989)) (involving drug testing of customs officials who wanted promotions and those
who handled weapons). See generally Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
6 See Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 484 (Blake, J., dissenting).
67 See Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 487 (Blake, J., dissenting); see also Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483
U.S. 868 (1987); United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 896-97 (1975).
6S See Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 487 (Blake, J., dissenting).
69 See Paul-Emile, supra note 4, at 360-61 (noting this wide degree of discretion); see also
Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 474 (outlining indicia of cocaine use).
70 See Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 485-86 (Blake, J., dissenting) (telling story of each arrested
woman, nine out often of whom were African American); cf Paul-Emile, supra note 4, at 328 nl0 (cit-
ing that 29 of the 30 women were African American).
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THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN FERGUSON V.
CITY OF CHARLESTON
The plaintiffs in the case appealed to the Supreme Court of the
United States on the ground that the warrant and probable cause
requirements with respect to searches and seizures, mandated by
the Fourth Amendment, were not met. Moreover, the plaintiffs
contend that the Fourth Circuit incorrectly used the "special
needs" balancing test. That test, they asserted, has never been
used with respect to a search serving the "normal needs of law
enforcement," obtained without the individual's consent, as was
the case here.71 The City responded with two defenses. First,
that the searches were constitutional because, as a matter of fact,
the women had consented to the searches. Alternatively, the
City argued that the searches were reasonable in that they were
justified by "special non-law enforcement purposes."72
The Court first noted that it was not deciding the issue of the
sufficiency of evidence with respect to whether or not consent had
been obtained from the patients subjected to the drug testing, but
that instead it was assuming, for purposes of the decision, that
"the searches were conducted without the informed consent of the
patients."73 Recognizing that the hospital was a state hospital,
and therefore its employees were government actors subject to
compliance with the Fourth Amendment,74 the Court concluded
that the urine toxicology tests conducted by the hospital were
"indisputably" searches within the meaning of the Fourth
71 See Brief for Petitioner at 19-20, Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001); see
also Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 73-75 (summarizing petitioner's claims); Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 475-76
(summarizing appellant's position).
72 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 73-74 (stating that District Court rejected second defense be-
cause searches in question "were not done by the medical university for independent purposes. Instead,
the police came in and there was an agreement reached that the positive screens would be shared with
the police").
73 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 74-75 (abstracting the factual finding).
14 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 74-75; see also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 335-37
(1985) ("But this Court has never limited the Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and
seizures to operations conducted by the police. Rather, the Court has long spoken of the Fourth
Amendment's strictures as restraints imposed upon 'governmental action'-that is, 'upon the activities
of sovereign authority").
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Amendment. 75 Citing the "special needs" line of cases in which
the drug-testing was held not to infringe upon the Fourth
Amendment, 76 the Court concluded that this case was not analo-
gous with those cases in that they dealt with an asserted "special
need" that "was divorced from the State's general interest in law
enforcement."77 Moreover, the Court also distinguished the
Charleston hospital's policy's "central and indispensable fea-
ture. . ." of "the use of law enforcement to coerce ... patients into
substance abuse treatment"7 8 from those situations in which
health care providers may be obligated by law or ethics to report
information obtained through ordinary treatment.7 9
Next, it was noted that even though the city argued that the
"benificent" primary purpose behind the policy was protecting the
health of both mother and child,80 the Court disagreed and con-
cluded that 'the purpose actually served by the MUSC searches
"is ultimately indistinguishable from the general interest in
crime control,"'' In reaching that conclusion, the Court pointed
75 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 74-75 (citing Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489
U.S. 602, 617 (1989); see also Laura Martin, Recent Developments: Select Recent Court Decisions, 27
AM. J.L. & MED. 345, 346 (2001) (noting that Supreme Court has treated urine screens taken by state
agents as searches within meaning of Fourth Amendment); Toll, supra note 40, at 304 (stating that
Court reiterated that urine tests constituted searches under Fourth Amendment).
76 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 75-77 (citing Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646,
664-65 (1995); Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 711; Skinner, 489 U.S. at 634); see also Stahlman, supra note
55, at 32 (explaining that Justice Stevens distinguished Ferguson from previous "special needs" line of
cases involving urinalysis testing).
77 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 78-79; see also Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment as a
"Big Time" TV Fad, 53 HASTINGs L.J. 265, 281 (2001) (stating majority of Supreme Court correctly
concluded that Ferguson was distinguishable from previous cases in which Court considered whether
similar drug tests were constitutionally permitted suspicionless searches); Leading Case, supra note 40,
at 329 (stating that Justice Stevens emphasized that difference between instant case and other cases in
which Court upheld similar drug tests was that hospital's drug testing policy had central law enforce-
ment purpose).
78 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 80-82; see also Leading Case, supra note 40, at 329 (explaining
that Court noted close involvement of Charleston police and prosecutors in design and administration of
hospital's search policy); Toll, supra note 40, at 304 (noting crucial component of MUSC's drug testing
policy was threat of arrest and prosecution if patient failed to comply with drug treatment obligations).
79 See Ferguson, 121 S. Ct at 1290 (stating use of law enforcement to coerce patients into
drug abuse treatment distinguished case from situations in which doctors discover information about
patients in ordinary course of treatment, latter of which must be reported under rules of law or ethics);
see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-602 (Michie 1999) (requiring health care professionals and facilities
to report all cases of intentionally inflicted knife or gunshot wounds); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3620
(Supp. 2000) (requiring "any... person having responsibility for the care or treatment of children" to
report suspected abuse or neglect to peace officer or child protective services).
so See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 80-82 (stating essence of respondents' argument is that protec-
tion of health of both mother and child is beneficent goal).
8' See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 80-82; see also Stahlman, supra note 55, at 32 (stating that ma-
jority rejected respondents' argument that search policy's ultimate goal was to protect health of mothers
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to the actual document codifying the hospital's policy, which con-
tained the police's operational guidelines, but did not include a
discussion of different courses of medical treatment for mother or
infant, except for treatment of the mother's drug addiction.8 2
Furthermore, they noted that "[t]he threat of law enforcement
may ultimately have been intended as a means to an end, but the
direct and primary purpose of MUSC's policy was to ensure the
use of those means .... Because law enforcement involvement al-
ways serves some broader social purpose or objectives, under [the
city]'s view, virtually all nonconsensual suspicionless search
could be immunized under the special needs doctrine by defining
the search solely in terms of its ultimate, rather than immediate,
purpose." 83 Based on the foregoing reasoning, the Court con-
cluded that "[gliven the primary purpose of the Charleston pro-
gram, which was to use the threat of arrest and prosecution in
order to force women into treatment, and given the extensive in-
volvement of law enforcement officials at every state of the policy
this case simply does not fit within the closely guarded category
of 'special needs."'8 4
Moreover, the Court noted that certain seizure cases, such as
Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz,85 which used a balancing
test in determining Fourth Amendment reasonableness and upon
which the Fourth Circuit relied, were not applicable in this case
for two reasons.8 6 First, those cases involved roadblock seizures,
and their children); Toll, supra note 40, at 306 (noting that Court did not accept respondents' claim that
desire to protect unborn children justified drug testing as special need).
82 See Ferguson, 121 S. Ct at 1290-91 (noting that document codifying search policy incor-
porated police operational procedures including chain of custody, and police notification and arrest but
did discuss alternative courses of medical treatment for mother or infant); see also LaFave, supra note
77, at 281 (stating that law enforcement purpose of search policy and extensive police involvement in
policy led Court to conclude that case did not fit within "special needs" category); Toll, supra note 40,
at 304 (stating majority identified four instances in which law enforcement goals took precedence over
hospital's asserted purpose of protecting health of mothers and their children).
83 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 82-85; see also LaFave, supra note 77, at 281 (arguing major-
ity's conclusion was essential to avoid circumvention of Fourth Amendment warrant and probable
cause protections through use of "special needs" doctrine); Toll, supra note 40, at 306 (stating majority
determined immediate purpose of hospital's search policy was to promote law enforcement goals).
84 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 84-85; see also Leading Case, supra note 40, at 329 (stating Court
concluded such searches were unconstitutional as they did not fall within special needs exception to
Fourth Amendment); Journal's Editorial Staff, Developments and Trends in the Law: Synopsis of State
Case and Statutory Law, I YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 237, 283 (2001) (stating the Court
ruled special needs exception to Fourth Amendment safeguards does not apply to hospital drug testing
procedure enacted for law enforcement purposes and not medical purposes).
8 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
86 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 75-81 (distinguishing this case from cases applying balance of
interests test); see also Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990) (upholding
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"rather than 'the intrusive search of the body or the home.' 8
Searches, especially those involving the sanctity of one's own
person (as in the case of searching one's bodily fluids), are to be
"afforded the most stringent Fourth Amendment protection."88
Second, the Court has explicitly distinguished those cases deal-
ing with roadblock checkpoints from those dealing with 'special
needs.'8 9
Finally, the Court realizes that in certain situations, state hos-
pital employees may have the duty to reveal evidence of criminal
conduct they inadvertently acquire, a duty which all citizens
have.90 Here, however, because employees here "undert[ook] to
obtain such evidence from their patients for the specific purpose
of incriminating those patients, they [had] a special obligation to
make sure that the patients [were] fully informed about their
constitutional rights, as standards of knowing waiver require."91
FOURTH AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS OF THESE PROSECUTIONS
The Fourth Circuit, holding that the collection and testing of
these women's urine constituted a 'special needs' search and
therefore justified after weighing all of the relevant factors, was
constitutionality of sobriety checkpoints where government interest outweighed privacy intrusion);
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 555 (1976) (weighing public interest against individ-
ual's Fourth Amendment rights).
87 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 84 (quoting Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)); see also Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 559 (differentiating between
checkpoint stops and other Fourth Amendment intrusions); United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 897
(1975) (noting difference between automobile searches and searches of homes or offices).
" Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 561 (noting one's expectation of privacy in an automobile is
different from traditional expectation of privacy one would expect in one's home); see also McDonald
v. United States, 335 U.S. 451,453 (1948) (remarking that Fourth Amendment protection marks the
right of privacy as one of unique values of our civilization); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-
92 (1914) (remarking that effect of Fourth Amendment is to put limitations on power of government).
89 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 84 (citing Sitz, 496 U.S. at 450) (addressing issue of "special
needs" in context of sobriety checkpoints); see also Illinois v. MacArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001)
(noting special needs of law enforcement as exception to warrant requirement).
9o See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 90 (noting existence of situations where hospital employees
have duty to report evidence of criminal conduct); see, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-510 (Law Co-op
2000) (requiring physicians and nurses to report information that child has been abused or neglected to
child welfare agency or law enforcement officials received "when [learned] in the person's professional
capacity").
91 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 85; see also National Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S.
656, 666 (1989) (requiring employee consent for use of drug test results in criminal prosecution); ef
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-468 (1966) (holding a confession is voluntary only if defendant
has been informed of his constitutional rights).
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not justified according to the factual record.92 In general, the Su-
preme Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment require-
ment that any search or seizure be "reasonable" to mean that ei-
ther probable cause or a warrant are required in any search or
arrest by a government agent.93 There are several exceptions to
these warrant and probable cause requirements, 94 including in-
stances in which the "special needs" of law enforcement make
those requirements impracticable, 95 upon which the majority of
the Fourth Circuit relied in reaching its holding. 96 Even if such a
special needs search is found, it must be weighed against the in-
dividual's privacy interest and the effectiveness of the intru-
sion.97
92 See Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 484 (Blake, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with holding that search
was reasonable under "special needs exception to warrant requirement); see also Chandler v. Miller,
520 U.S. 305, 314 (1997) (noting that when "special needs" are alleged as justification for Fourth
Amendment intrusion courts should undertake a context-specific inquiry); Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665-
666 (stressing importance of balancing individual's privacy interests against government's interests).
93 See Yatter, supra note 43, at 912 (noting Supreme Court's interpretation of Fourth
Amendment reasonableness requirement calls for arrests to be based on probable cause and executed
pursuant to warrant); see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (holding Fourth Amend-
ment makes presumptive warrant requirement for searches and seizures); Johnson v. United States, 333
U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948) (stating Fourth Amendment imposes warrant requirement for search and seizure
unless pre-existing exception exists).
94 See Yatter, supra note 43, at 912, 982-988 (listing exceptions to probable cause and war-
rant requirements: investigatory detentions, warrantless arrests, searches incident to valid arrest, seizure
of items in plain view, exigent circumstances, consent searches, vehicle searches, container searches,
inventory searches, border searches, searches at sea, administrative searches, and searches in which
special needs of law enforcement make requirements impracticable); see also Craig M. Bradley, Two
Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1468, 1473-74 (1985) (providing extensive list of
exceptions to warrant and probable cause requirements); Cathryn Jo Rosen & John S. Goldkamp, The
Constitutionality of Drug Testing at the Bail Stage, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 114, 133 (1989)
(offering three broad categories of exceptions that justify warrantless urinalysis performed without
probable cause: searches permitted by virtue of subject's arrest, non-criminal administrative searches,
and consent searches). See generally Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995) (as-
serting that "special needs" making warrant and probable cause requirement impractical exist in public
school setting); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 627-631 (1989) (holding
drug testing requirement justified by public safety interest).
95 See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 873 (1987) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J. concurring)) (stating searches unsupported by probable cause can be
constitutional "when special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and
probable-cause requirements impracticable."); cf Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 515 U.S. at 661 (holding
drug testing of student athletes in public schools was justified by school's interest in deterring drug use
and maintaining discipline); Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 670-72 (holding drug testing of Customs Service
officials seeking transfer or promotion to certain positions was justified by public safety interest in
keeping front-line [drug] interdiction personnel and customs officials who must carry firearms drug-
free); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620 (requiring blood and urine testing of employees involved in major train
accidents). But see Chandler, 520 U.S. at 318-19 (refusing to find special need in Georgia statute re-
quiring drug testing of candidates for public office as prerequisite for eligibility in running).
96 See Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 479.
97 See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 515 U.S. at 652-53, 658 (recognizing special needs search
analysis requires balancing intrusion on individual's Fourth Amendment interests against promotion of
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In light of this backdrop, as the Supreme Court held, Charles-
ton's alleged interest in protecting the health of unborn fetuses
from drug exposure from drug-using mothers was in fact a le-
gitimate special need interest justifying the drug testing of these
mothers. However, any use of the fruits of the search and sei-
zure, in criminally prosecuting those who are subjected to the
search or seizure was beyond the scope of what the Supreme
Court intended to include in justifying a search or seizure on a
special needs basis.98 None of the Supreme Court cases justifying
drug testing without probable cause or a warrant involved using
any positive drug test result in a criminal prosecution. In addi-
tion, even though the Supreme Court has never explicitly recog-
nized an exception to special needs searches when such seizures
result in criminal prosecution, those cases in which such a search
was upheld did not involve criminal prosecution. Moreover,
those cases involved drug testing programs in which the consent
of those individuals who tested positive was required before any
criminal prosecutors were contacted. 99
Even if the Supreme Court had applied the Sitz balancing test,
as the Fourth Circuit had done, the drug testing program would
not have satisfied the effectiveness prong of a special needs
analysis. 100 More effective means of handling the concerns of
heightened drug use among pregnant women and fetal health
legitimate governmental interests); see also Willis v. Anderson Community Sch. Corp., 158 F.3d 415,
421 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding special needs search analysis requires balancing special need against pri-
vacy interest at stake and intrusiveness of search); McCabe v. Life-Line Ambulance Serv., Inc., 77 F.3d
540, 546-47 (1 st Cir. 1996) (explaining special needs search analysis requires balancing special need
against "nature and quality of the intrusion" of privacy interest).
98 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 78 n.12 (holding special needs exception to Fourth Amendment
does not apply to policies that are linked to law enforcement goals); see also Book, supra note 45, at
652 (2000) (discussing group suspicion searches which are limited to non-criminal searches); Toll, su-
pra note 40, at 312-13 (citing previous special needs cases that employed protections against releasing
information to third parties).
99 See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 666 (concerning drug screening program that required em-
ployee's written consent before positive test results could be turned over to any other agency, "includ-
ing criminal prosecutors"); see also Chandler, 520 U.S. at 318 (explaining that drug testing guidelines
require that test results be given first to the candidate "who further controls dissemination of the re-
port"); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 515 U.S. at 650 (requiring both students and their parents to sign form
consenting to drug testing for athletic participation).
1"0 See Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 478 (concluding "prenatal testing was the only effective means
available to accomplish the primary policy goal of persuading women to stop using cocaine during their
pregnancies in order to reduce health effects on children exposed to cocaine in utero"); see also Drago,
supra note 38, at 181-82 (explaining that harsh criminal sanctions are not effective means for protecting
fetuses from alcohol abuse); McMeans-Muloway, supra note 44, at 63 (discussing Fourth Circuit hold-
ing in Ferguson).
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were available.' 0 ' The arrest of many of these mothers at a late
stage in pregnancy or after delivery after the negative impact of
the drugs on the fetus had already occurred, leads to the conclu-
sion that the effectiveness of such programs is questionable, not-
withstanding the otherwise alleged legitimate purposes.10 2
OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF SUSPICIONSLEss DRUG
TESTING FOR PURPOSES OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTION NOT RAISED
IN FERGUSON
Reproductive Privacy
The constitutional right to reproductive privacy has been
firmly established in American jurisprudence, beginning with
Skinner v. Oklahoma 0 3 and Griswold v. Connecticut,0 4 and cul-
minating in Roe v. Wade'05 and the subsequent line of abortion
cases. 106 It has been established that the Constitution not only
protects women from being forced to terminate wanted pregnan-
cies but also prevents penalizing them for carrying their preg-
'0' See discussion infra Part IV.
102 See Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 488 (Blake, J., dissenting) (making observation that seven ar-
rests were made after women had given birth, and that three of them were actually tested during or after
delivery); see also McMeans-Muloway, supra note 44, at 66 (discussing policy utilized in Ferguson as
facially discriminatory); Vaughn, supra note 62, at 865 (reaching same conclusion).
'03 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (invalidating, on equal protection grounds, statute mandating
sterilization for those convicted of three "moral turpitude" felonies, stating "[m]arriage and procreation
are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race").
'04 381 U.S. 479, 483-86 (1965) (recognizing that "penumbra" of rights emanating from
Constitution, including rights to marry and procreate, lead to implied right of privacy in reproductive
decisions in marriage); see, e.g., Cary v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-88 (1977) (stating
access to contraceptives can not be denied without a compelling state interest); Paul, 424 U.S. at 713
(reserving due process right of privacy challenges to area of marriage, procreation, contraception, fam-
ily relationships, and child rearing and education); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (ex-
tending right of privacy in reproductive decisions to unmarried couples).
l0' 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1972) (holding reproductive privacy right was "broad enough to en-
compass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy"); see also Stenberg v. Carhart,
530 U.S. 914, 921 (2000) (citing Roe v. Wade as standing for constitutional right of women to choose
option of abortion); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992) (stating
Roe v. Wade stands for liberty of woman to terminate her pregnancy in its early stages).
106 See, e.g. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 930 (striking down state partial birth abortion statute in
that it contained no provision for exceptions in medical emergencies and when the mother's life is at
stake, and placed "undue burdens" on woman by discouraging doctors from performing technique due
to overbroad language in statue); Casey, 505 U.S. at 874 (reaffirming woman's abortion right and disal-
lowing any restrictions which are "undue burdens" on this right); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,
190 (1986) (limiting due process rights to those involving reproduction and not to homosexual inter-
course).
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nancies to term. 107 In light of this firmly established constitu-
tional right of procreation, and the Supreme Court's position of
favoring the health of the mother over that of the fetus,108 the
Charleston hospital's policy should be seen as a constitutional
violation in that it severely pressured drug-using women into in-
voluntarily terminating their pregnancies in an attempt to avoid
criminal charges, and furthermore, punished women for carrying
their babies to term. 0 9 Despite society's views, many of these
women are not immoral for having chosen to continue taking
drugs over protecting the health of the fetus inside of them. 110
Moreover, the scarcity of drug rehabilitation programs in poorer
urban areas such as Charleston mandate the view that these
women should not be denied their right to procreate."'
'07 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 859 (noting that Roe v. Wade has been "sensibly relied upon" to
counter attempts to interfere with woman's decision to become pregnant or to carry to term); see also
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974) (striking down school system policy
requiring maternity leave without pay at fifth month of pregnancy, characterizing the policy as "acting
to penalize the pregnant teacher for deciding to bear a child, overly restrictive maternity leave regula-
tions can constitute a heavy burden on the exercise of... protected freedoms [of personal choice in
matters of marriage and family life]"); Arnold v. Bd. of Educ. of Escambia County, 880 F.2d 305, 311
(11 th Cir. 1989) (stating "[tihere can be no question that the individual must be free to decide to carry a
child to term"). But see Whitnier v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 785 (S.C. 1997) (refusing, in fetal prosecu-
tion case, to recognize woman's argument that imprisonment is much greater burden on exercise of her
freedom to carry fetus to term than unpaid maternity leave recognized in LaFleur, and instead, Court
characterized the privacy as one of using crack cocaine, which was not a fundamental privacy right.).
'08 See Paul-Emile, supra note 4, at 381 ("The United States Supreme Court has consistently
rejected claims that fetal rights should trump maternal rights ... ."); see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 912-14
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (agreeing with Court's reaffirmation that health of pregnant women take prece-
dence over health of their fetus); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,
476 U.S. 747, 779 n.8 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting fetuses have never been considered per-
sons); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 400-01 (1979) (invalidating statute that didn't guarantee
mother's health always prevailed over life and health of fetus).
"09 See Paul-Emile, supra note 4, at 384 ("The women prosecuted under the Policy would not
have been prosecuted or even charged with a crime had they terminated their pregnancies. Hence, they
were prosecuted for exercising their constitutional right to procreate."). See generally Dorian L. Eden,
Note, Is It Constitutional and Will it be Effective? An Analysis of Mandatory HIV Testing of Pregnant
Woman, II HEALTH MATRIX 659, 662-64 (2001) (discussing maternal-fetal conflict in setting of man-
datory HIV testing).
" See Katherine Irwin, Ideology, Pregnancy and Drugs: Differences Between Crack-
Cocaine, Heroin and Metamphetamine Users, 22 CONTEMP. DRUG PROB. 613, 614 (1995) (portraying
society's view of pregnant addicts as "individuals who willingly put themselves and their unborn babies
into psychopharmacological prisons where their actions, feelings and experiences are determined by the
damaging effects of the drugs they take"); Stacey L. Best, Comment, Fetal Equality?: The Equality
State's Response to the Challenge of Prosecuting Unborn Children, 32 LAND & WATER L. REv 193,
197 (1997) (describing pregnant addicts as being "viewed as lacking some intrinsic moral compass");
Sheryl McCarthy, These Defective Moms Need Treatment, Not Prison, NEWSDAY (New York), May 2 1,
2001, at A24 (describing plight of one addicted woman who was sentenced for murder of her stillborn
baby).
" See, Paul-Emile, supra note 4, at 344-49. Paul-Emile noted that African American moth-
ers, post-slavery, have been faced with society's view that they are "unfit mothers," as liabilities and
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Confidentiality of Medical Records
In reaching its conclusion that an individual does not possess a
constitutionally guaranteed right to privacy through the nondis-
closure of medical records, the Fourth Circuit relied on Whalen v.
Roe,112 in which the Supreme Court failed to recognize such a
right.113 Also, the issue involved disclosure to a limited number of
people rather than the general public." 4 What the Fourth Circuit
failed to note, however, was that disclosure of the test results
would result in criminal conviction, in other words, a permanent
stamp of public disapproval, which should be regarded as an in-
trusion on privacy." 5 Furthermore, the disclosure that a woman
is pregnant further implicates an invasion of privacy, especially if
a woman has reasons to keep such information secret. 1 6
In the context of the fiduciary relationship between a doctor
drains upon the economy. Early family planning initiatives in the 1930's and '40's were aimed at Afri-
can American women in efforts to reduce their birth rate. During the 1970's, African American women
were threatened with removal from welfare upon refusal to agree to sterilization. Even in the 1990's,
the contraceptive Norplant was aimed at controlling African American fertility.
1 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
" See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 186 F.3d 469, 482 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting circuit split
on this issue and describing Whalen); see also Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466, 480 (6d Cir. 1999)
("[Tihe Whalen Court concluded that the law at issue, which compiled data on patient prescriptions, did
not implicate the alleged privacy interest in avoiding the disclosure of private matters"); Barry v. City
of New York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1559 (2nd Cir. 1983) ("The nature and extent of the [privacy] interest
recognized in Whalen and Nixon, and the appropriate standard of review for alleged infringements of
that interest, are unclear").
114 See Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 482 (noting results were only disclosed to certain law en-
forcement officials, not to general public); see also Williams, supra note 57, at 192 (discussing Court's
reasoning that governmental interest outweighed the privacy interest of the patients in their medical
records based on the nonpublic nature of the disclosure). See generally Vaughn, supra note 62, at 695-
696 (arguing Whalen allowed for the possibility of future court finding privacy right in highly sensitive
medical records, such as the records at issue in Ferguson).
"5 See Ferguson, 121 S.Ct. 1281, 1288 (2001) (noting use of positive drug test results to
disqualify one from eligibility for particular benefit, as was the case in Skinner, Von Raab, Vernonia), is
much less intrusive on privacy than "unauthorized dissemination of such results to third parties"); see
also Vaughn, supra note 62, at 689 (opining hospital patients suffered increased intrusion on privacy
when law enforcement officers were notified of positive drug test results by physicians). See generally
Margo L. Ely, Waging War Against Drugs - and Expectant Mothers, CHI. DAILY L. BULLETIN, Oct. 9,
2000, at 5 (noting Court concluded disclosure was limited, therefore no privacy violation occurred).
116 See Mills, supra note 11, at 1027 (explaining women may want to keep pregnancy secret
for fear of domestic violence resulting from increased financial strain and feelings of not wanting a
child); Shari Roan, A Dirty Secret: Society Would Like to Think That All Expectant Moms are Cher-
ished, But Pregnancy May Start--or Increase-Domestic Violence, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1995, at El
(citing survey finding 6% of women who had recently given birth reported being beaten during preg-
nancy); see also Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Pennsylvania, 505 U.S. 833, 887-899 (1992) (striking
down state statute's spousal notification requirement as prerequisite to abortion, reasoning that risk of
increased domestic violence may result).
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and patient, a relationship in which trust and confidence is of
paramount importance, patients have a reasonable expectation
that their test results will not be shared with non-medical per-
sonnel without their consent. 117 In fact, not only did the hospital
violate its own policy of maintaining confidentiality of patient
medical records," 8 it also violated a federal statute prohibiting
disclosure of drug test results to substantiate or initiate criminal
prosecution. 119 All of this leads to the conclusion that the hospital
should not have been allowed to disclose the drug test results to
law enforcement officials without the patient's informed consent.
Right to Refuse Medical Treatment
The right to refuse medical treatment has been firmly estab-
lished in American law through the Common Law Doctrine of In-
formed Consent, 20 as well as in constitutional precedent.' 21 In
17 See Ferguson, 121 S.Ct. at 1289, n.14 (citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600)
(stating "we have previously recognized that an intrusion on that expectation may have adverse conse-
quences because it my deter patients from receiving needed medical care"); see also Paul-Emile, supra
note 4, at 363 (commenting health care providers and patients share fiduciary relationship that places
upon providers affirmative duty of confidentiality). See generally Eden, supra note 109, at 682 (arguing
a doctor-patient relationship lacking in trust will result in many women not seeking prenatal counsel-
ing).
'18 See Paul-Emile, supra note 4, at 363-64 (arguing hospital's consent forms, which allowed
attending physician to "reveal information to appropriate agencies and individuals," would not give
patient reason to believe that law enforcement were included); see also Andrew S. Krulwich & Bruce L.
McDonald, Evolving Constitutional Privacy Doctrines Affecting Healthcare Enterprises, 55 FOOD
DRUG L.J. 491, 505 (2000) (stating plaintiff's argument that hospital gave no indication that its confi-
dentiality policy did not apply to these women); Vaughn, supra note 62, at 687 (noting consent forms
did not disclose to patients that results would be disclosed to the police).
1,9 See 42 U.S.C. §290dd-2(c) (1999) (stating "Except as authorized by a court order granted
under subsection (b)(2)(C), no record referred to in subsection (a) may be used to initiate or substantiate
any criminal charges against a patient or to conduct any investigation of a patient"); see also Michael
Bagge, Survey: Health Law, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 547, 553 (1999) (commenting 42 U.S.C. §290dd-2
maintains the confidentiality of admission records to chemical dependency treatment centers); Vaughn,
supra note 62, at 366 n. 198 (noting §290dd-2 prohibits the disclosure of patients' records by drug pro-
grams for use in criminal charges).
120 See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990) (characterizing in-
formed consent doctrine as "firmly entrenched in American tort law"); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 70
(N.Y. 1981) (recognizing right to refuse medical treatment based on informed consent doctrine); see,
e.g., W. KEETON ET AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 189-192 (5th ed. 1984). See
generally F. ROzOVSKY, CONSENT TO TREATMENT, A PRACTICAL GUIDE § 1. 11.2 at 1:53 - 55 (3d ed.
2000).
,21 See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278-79 (noting "the principle that a competent person has a con-
stitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our
prior decisions" and explaining liberty interest in refusing treatment is to be balanced against the rele-
vant state interest); see also In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (N.J. 1976) cert. denied sub nom. Garger
v. N.J., 429 U.S. 922 (1976) (holding person in vegetative state had right to terminate treatment privacy
grounded in Constitutional right to privacy); see, e.g., Wash. v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229 (1990) (hold-
ing "forcible injection of medication into a non consenting [prisoner]'s body represents a substantial
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light of this established right and the view that drug addiction is
a disease, 122 these women should not have been forced to undergo
drug treatment as their only alternative to being criminally
prosecuted, nor should they have been involuntarily tested for a
urine toxicology screen (which does constitute treatment). 23
What is more shocking is the fact that many women were in-
formed only after they had been screened. 124 Furthermore, re-
quiring these women to undergo such forced treatment under-
mines the fiduciary relationship between patient and health care
provider, one that is necessary for successful therapy. 125
interference with that person's liberty"); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979) (recognizing right of
children in not being confined unnecessarily for medical treatment); Jacobson v. Mass., 197 U.S. 11,
24-30 (1905) (balancing individual's liberty interest in declining unwanted smallpox vaccine against
state's interest in preventing disease).
122 See Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 18 (1925) (finding physician's providing narcot-
ics to patient during medical treatment for substance addiction did not violate Narcotics Laws); see also
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (citing Linder, and holding drug addiction is not a
crime but an illness). See generally, Doretta Massardo McGinnis, Comment, Prosecution of Mothers of
Drug-Exposed Babies: Constitutional and Criminal Theory, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 505, 522 (1990) (not-
ing medical community has widely accepted the disease model of addiction and the American Psychiat-
ric Association considers drug addictions to be mental disorders).
123 See Paul-Emile, supra note 4, at 363 (stating Charleston's policy violated right to refuse
medical treatment); see also James A. Filkins, M.D., Ph.D., A Pregnant Mother's Right To Refuse
Treatment Beneficial To Her Fetus: Refusing Blood Transfusions, 2 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 361,
363 (1998) (stating some courts have held the State's interest in the well-being of patient's child out-
weighs the right of the patient to refuse medical treatment, if the children would be deprived of parent
by the patient's refusal of treatment). But see People v. Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397 (I1. 1997) (stating the
State's interest in the preservation of life, the prevention of suicide, protection of third parties, and the
ethical integrity of the medical profession does not override patient's decision to refuse medical treat-
ment). See generally John P. Elwood, What Were They Thinking: The Supreme Court in Revue, Octo-
ber Term 2000, 4 THE GREEN BAG 365, 372-373 (commenting Ferguson is interesting because of Jus-
tice Steven's suggestion that before waiving Fourth Amendment rights, one must be informed of the
rights he or she is waiving); Paul-Emile, supra note 4, at 363 (stating Charleston's policy violated right
to refuse medical treatment); VanRaalte, supra note 3, at 468 (arguing Cruzan Court acknowledged the
right to refuse treatment is the logical consequence of informed consent).
124 See Paul-Emile, supra note 4, at 364-65 (the letter stated in part that "[i]f however, we
continue to detect evidence of drug abuse or a failure to follow recommended treatment, we will take
action to protect your unborn child... There was no indication that the urine test was conducted for law
enforcement purposes, or that such confidential medical information was to be revealed to the local po-
lice department"); see also Anable v. Ford, 663 F. Supp. 149, 152 (W.D. Ark. 1985) (holding student's
consent as insufficient because the student was not fully informed and was misled as to what they were
giving consent to); Chandler, 520 U.S. at 313 (stating Georgia's drug testing requirement "effects a
search within the meaning of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments").
125 See Paul-Emile, supra note 4, at 363 (noting that consulting health care provider is not
the same as granting them general consent to investigate other medical conditions of the patient); see
also supra Part III-A-3 (discussing confidentiality). See generally Poland et al., Punishing Pregnant
Drug Users: Enhancing the Flight from Care, 31 DRUG AND ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 199-203 (1993).
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The Eighth Amendment & Cruel and Unusual Punishment
The Supreme Court's holding in Robinson v. California,12 6 that
addiction cannot be the basis for criminal prosecution, pursuant
to the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and un-
usual punishment, 127 coupled with the modern view of drug use
as a disease 128 further point to the need to eradicate any and all
policies resulting in criminal prosecutions of pregnant drug ad-
dicts.
The Fourteenth Amendment & Equal Protection
The Equal Protection clause provides that "[nio state
shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws."129 Charleston's policy may be seen as an in-
fringement on equal protection, both on the basis of gender and
race. 1 30 Traditionally, the Supreme Court has recognized that
any such classification may be a violation of the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection, and that the clause guarantees
that those similarly situated are to be treated similarly, and logi-
cally, that those who are not similarly situated need not be
treated similarly.' 3'
116 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
127 See id., at 666-67 (describing drug addiction as disease similar to any other illness); see
also U.S. CONST. amend. VII1 (providing that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted"). See generally Robinson, 370 U.S. at 667
(citing Linder, and holding that drug addiction is not a crime but an illness).
128 See Paul-Emile, supra note 4, at 235 (stating Charleston's Policy only punished women
for their addiction, rather than addressing health problems associated with it, and that addiction is
viewed as disease); see also United States v. Southern Management Corp., 955 F.3d 914, 921 (4th Cir.
1992) (recognizing that World Health Organization and American Psychiatric Association classify sub-
stance addiction as disease).
129 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The aforementioned language refers to the Equal Protec-
tion clause. The remainder of§ 1 of the amendment include the privileges and immunities and due
process clauses, providing that "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the united States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, lib-
erty, or property, without due process of law".
30 See Paul-Emile, supra note 4, at (arguing Charleston's Policy was discriminatory towards
Black Women); Mills, supra note 11, at 1028 (arguing Charleston's Policy violates equal protection on
race and gender basis). See generally Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (imposing intermediate
standard of review on gender classifications).
131 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW, § 16-1, at 1438 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing how any violation has the potential of arising equal pro-
tection claim if there be any form of classification or separation).
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Gender Classification
Classification on the basis of gender has been recognized as a
possible infringement upon equal protection. Such classification
has been subject to an intermediate scrutiny standard of review:
in other words, if the gender classification is closely related to an
important governmental interest, then the classification is not a
violation of equal protection, and therefore, is constitutionally
permissible.132 In classifications based on biological factors, such
as pregnancy, the Court has held that such classifications do not
discriminate on the basis of sex, and that therefore only a ra-
tional basis standard of review is applied. 133 As long as the classi-
fication is rationally related to a legitimate governmental inter-
est, it is constitutionally permissible. 34 Cases in which rational
basis review was used in pregnancy classifications involving in-
surance coverage do not nearly implicate privacy considerations
involved in fetal prosecution programs. As a result, a higher
standard of review may be justified in determining the constitu-
tionality of these fetal prosecution programs. 35
Race Discrimination
The leading case for equal protection challenges on the basis of
' See Craig, 429 U.S. at 197 (imposing intermediate standard of review on gender classifi-
cations); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (upholding gender-based classifications to remedy
disadvantageous conditions suffered by women in both economic and military life); Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971) (stating such review is "subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause"
and must serve important governmental objective);
133 See General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 136 (1976) (adopting conclusion in
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) that excluding pregnancy from insurance coverage is not gen-
der-based discrimination); see also Geduldig, 417 U.S. 496 n. 20 (noting "while it is true that only
women can become pregnant, it does not follow that every legislative classification concerning preg-
nancy is a sex-based classification"); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 691-92 (1973) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (cautioning Court against adopting view that all sex-based classifications are inherently
suspect).
34 See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 808-09 (1997) (finding public interests offered in sup-
port of law prohibiting assisted suicide satisfied rational relation review requirements); Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620, 631-32 (1996) (discussing rational basis review employed by the Court); Williamson v.
Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 486-87 (1955) (upholding laws which restricted dispens-
ing of lenses and frames to licensed optometrists and ophthalmologists).
135 See Mills, supra note 11, at 1029 (arguing that the possibility of incarceration in fetal
prosecution programs raises the stakes because of limitations such treatment places on personal liberty);
see also UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 199-200 (1991) (applying intermediate scrutiny
in striking down workplace policy prohibiting women of childbearing age from work which could have
exposed them to substances potentially harmful to reproductive health); Craig, 429 U.S. at 197
(describing permissible gender classifications under intermediate scrutiny as those which "serve
important government objectives and. . . [are] substantially related to achievement of those
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race for facially neutral statutes is Washington v. Davis,136 which
requires a showing of discriminatory intent on the part of the
government entity or state actor. 137 Once a discriminatory intent
is shown, the statute is subject to strict scrutiny. 38 If the classifi-
cation is narrowly tailored to meet a compelling governmental in-
terest, it does not violate equal protection and is thus constitu-
tionally permissible. 39 The use of statistics has been important
in evaluation of whether there was a discriminatory intent in-
volved in a policy or statute. 40
The discriminatory intent involved in the Charleston hospital's
policy can be demonstrated in several specific areas: the policy
was only implemented at one public hospital in the Charleston
area that served a predominantly black and economically disad-
vantaged part of Charleston;' 4 ' and the policy only applied to
mothers who used cocaine, a drug whose cheapest form, crack,
tends to be concentrated in urban black communities. 42
136 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
137 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (noting Court will look to law's pur-
pose in evaluating its constitutionality); see also Watson v. Forth Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977,
994 (1988) (noting plaintiff needs to show more than mere statistical disparities to establish prima facie
case when challenging racially discriminatory employment practices); Eric K. Yamamoto et al., Dis-
mantling Civil Rights: Multiracial Resistance and Reconstruction, 31 CUMB. L. REv. 523, 546 (2000)
(citing Davis and agreeing that challenges to facially neutral statutes require showing of discriminatory
intent).
8 See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (stating that racial classifications
are examined with strict scrutiny); see also Bass v. Bd. of County Commissioners, 256 F.3d 1095, 1116
(11 th Cir. 2001) (noting racial classifications require strict scrutiny analysis); Albright v. New Orleans,
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9159, at 14 (E.D. La. 2001) (stating "[aill racial classifications imposed by a
governmental actor must be analyzed under the 'strict scrutiny' test").
"9 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (applying strict scrutiny and hold-
ing government sponsored school segregation policy violated equal protection); see also Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (applying strict scrutiny in dealing with relocation camps for
Japanese Americans during World War II); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 309-10 (1879)
(applying strict scrutiny in dealing with statutory exclusion of African Americans from jury duty).
14o See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886) (finding discriminatory intent in city
safety ordinance requiring masonry buildings for laundries when enforced against Chinese owners
while non-Chinese owners were not subjected to similar requirements). But see United States v. Edelin,
134 F. Supp. 2d 59, 85-87 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (expressing concern over the use of statistical data in claim
of racial discrimination regarding federal capital charges); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 287-91
(1987) (refusing to find discriminatory intent in statistical data showing black defendants in Georgia
courts were more likely to receive death sentence for killing whites than other defendants).
'41 See Paul-Emile, supra note 4, at 350 (emphasizing that the policy was applied to hospital
that served area of Charleston with a 70% Black population, compared to Charleston's 30% Black
population); see also Nancy Kubasek & Melissa Hinds, The Communitarian Case Against Prosecutions
for Prenatal Drug Abuse, 22 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 1, 10 (2000) (noting most prosecutions for prena-
tal drug use are brought against minority women).
142 See Paul-Emile, supra note 4, at 353-54 (noting that only cocaine use was targeted and
led to arrest and possible incarceration, despite study showing that only 0.79% of infants were exposed
to cocaine, versus 2.5% for marijuana and 1.9% for alcohol, both of which substances may also cause
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Furthermore, discriminatory intent can be demonstrated by
the fact that the hospital employees, some of whom openly held
racist views, had substantial discretion in determining who was
tested and who was reported. 143 Moreover, only African American
women were reported to the authorities. Consequently, the pol-
icy appears to have a racial discriminatory intent on the basis of
its unequal treatment in administration and effects.
The next step in equal protection analysis involves the weigh-
ing of discriminatory intent against the asserted state interest.
Here, Charleston asserted the interests in protecting fetal health
and reducing maternal drug use, as well as reducing the result-
ing social costs. While these may be compelling interests, the
means chosen to implement the policy do not appear to be nar-
rowly tailored to meet these otherwise noble ends. The clearly
discriminatory behavior on the part of the City of Charleston was
not justified by the asserted goals of the Policy. There exist less
extreme, more effective measures for reducing drug use and pro-
tecting an unborn fetus from being born with a drug addiction,
which reinforce the conclusion that the means were not narrowly
tailored to accomplish the compelling state interest. Thus, the
Policy appears to have violated the Equal Protection Clause.
CONCLUSION
Because the Charleston Policy of fetal prosecution and other
jurisdictions' similar policies violate many firmly established
constitutionally guaranteed rights and constitutional principles,
they should be banned forever. The existence and availability of
more effective and constitutionally permissible means of achiev-
ing the asserted compelling governmental interests in protecting
fetal health, reducing drug use in pregnant women and reducing
the resulting social and financial costs further justifies banning
such policies. Moreover, the judiciary's ludicrous interpretation
of child abuse, child neglect, and distribution of controlled sub-
stance statutes to apply to the fetuses of drug-using mothers not
fetal harm); see also Kubasek & Hinds, supra note 141, at 10 (focusing on and testing for crack cocaine
disparately affects minority women); Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies:
Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1419, 1420-21 (1991) (noting
most women charged with criminal offense in fetal prosecution cases are poor, black and addicted to
crack cocaine).
143 See Paul-Emile, supra note 4, at 360-61 (describing hospital staff's "unfettered discre-
tion" in running the program, including filing complaints and coordinating the mother's arrest).
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only serves to undermine constitutionally mandated separation
of powers by giving legislative powers to the courts, but violates
the firmly established principle that any ambiguity in criminal
statutes are to be construed in the narrowest manner possible.
Any belief that such policies will serve to deter drug use in
mothers and effectively protect fetuses is an erroneous conclu-
sion. It may be more likely that that mothers, in fear of being
criminally prosecuted, will actually refrain from seeking prenatal
care, leading to one of two detrimental results: either the in-
creased probability of birth defects or health risks for the child,
or the mother aborting her child. Both of these results, of course,
clearly run counter to the asserted governmental interest in pro-
tecting the health of fetuses.
Such policies exacerbate the problem by deterring women from
seeking vital pre-natal care. Rather, the policies criminally pun-
ish women for a legally and medically recognized condition, and
deprive them of certain fundamental constitutionally cherished
rights. In evaluating such policies, courts should heed the time-
less words of Justice Brandeis:
[I]t is immaterial that the intrusion was in aid of law en-
forcement. Experience should teach us to be most on guard
to protect liberty when the government's purposes are be-
neficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel
invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest
dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of
zeal, well-meaning but without understanding. 144
1" Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also
Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 687 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Jus-
tice Scalia commented:
Those who lose because of the lack of understanding that begot the present exer-
cise in symbolism are ... all of us-who suffer a coarsening of our national
manners that ultimately give the Fourth Amendment its content, and who become
subject to the administration of federal officials whose respect for our privacy
can hardly be greater than the small respect they have been taught to have for
their own.
Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 687 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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